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INFORMATION REPORT

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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This report presents, in question and answer form, information obtained by Department of the Army

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1. Q. How many manuals on atomic matters did you personally see and read?
 A. Source saw five separate publications: (1) Sergeants' and Soldiers' Atomic Defense Handbook (read), (2) Armed Forces Atomic Warfare Defense Manual (read), (3) Soviet Atomic Warfare Fortification Manual (skimmed), (4) Atomic Warfare Medical Treatment and Decontamination Manual (read), and (5) Atomic Defense Training Program pamphlet (read). Through his regimental secret documents section chief, source heard of two other manuals for use by field grade officers only. He had no knowledge of the names or contents of these latter manuals.
2. Q. Did you hear or read that the meeting engagement would be the most likely form of combat in any future conflict with atomic weapons?
 A. Source has neither read nor heard of anything to this effect. However, much emphasis was placed on "the march and meeting engagement" tactics in his unit during late 1953 and early 1954. Some of these exercises had vague atomic implications in that, during the march, troops had to don chemical defense equipment because of a purported "atomic explosion". Source could offer no further explanation on this matter.
3. Q. Was a particular officer appointed unit tactical atomic training officer in your organization?

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(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#")

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A. Source said that no one officer had been designated as unit atomic training officer to the best of his knowledge. The regimental surgeon gave the only atomic training lecture that source ever heard. The lecturer spoke on the theory of atomic fission, the effects of an explosion, the treatment of the wounded, and the theoretical types and sizes of atomic weapons [redacted]

4. Q. Did you ever specifically see or hear of any new frontages or dispersion area dimensions which were to be adopted in preparation for an atomic attack?

A. Source said that Armed Forces Atomic Warfare Defense Manual indicated that wider defense frontages, strengthened to withstand atomic attack, would be adopted. During an atomic attack, troops would be led from the actual front area to the area three to five kilometers from the front. Small, well-equipped guard units would be left at the front.

On the offensive, the forward Soviet elements would consist of armored units in combat column formation (up to a regiment per column). In front of these units would be a forward detachment, attacking in combat formation. Upon encountering an organized enemy, the columns would assume the usual combat formation.

If the opponent used an atomic weapon before a Soviet offense, it was to be assumed that the opponent had withdrawn its troops from the forward positions to protect them from atomic weapons. The Soviets were then to occupy these positions.

Concerning actual frontages, the manuals indicated only that fronts would be wider. They did not state in what manner or by what distances.

5. Q. Did you ever see any training aids, such as charts, posters, pictures, sample weapons, and vehicle pits, which were used to illustrate atomic or antiatomic principles?

A. Source never saw any training aid other than the manuals. In February 1954 his battalion CO tried to have the unit shown how to dig a squad shelter. The attempt was given up because of the cold and the hardness of the ground.

6. Q. Was the lecture on atomic training that you attended mandatory?

A. Source stated that all lectures were mandatory unless one was on some essential duty, such as OD.

7. Q. How many atomic training study groups did you actually attend?

A. In December 1953, source attended three or four of the five or six that were held. [redacted]

8. Q. Why do you think [redacted] that unit chemical officers are probably carrying on atomic training?

A. Source knew that the unit chemical officer was responsible for training the company decontamination groups [redacted]. However, he never saw the chemical officer train officers or other EM. The squad trained by the chemical officer was supposed to be able to decontaminate weapons, equipment, and clothing. However, on return to the company, the squad never gave any training to the company personnel.

9. Q. Did you personally teach, or see taught, any atomic weapons tactics combined with infantry tactics [redacted]

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[redacted] the Sergeants' and Soldiers' Atomic Defense Handbook. . . . During infantry tactics classes, all platoon leaders gave some general instructions on what to do in case an opponent used the atomic bomb. There were no specific instructions on how the platoon leaders were to conduct this training, so each one tried to teach what he had learned from reading the various manuals.

According to source, there was a great amount of disagreement in the entire program of atomic training. Consequently, each platoon leader taught what he believed to be correct [redacted] on officer attitudes during atomic study groups). Source repeated that he had paid only scant attention during instruction and study periods, that he had not at that time been interested in such matters, and that he sincerely wished to disclaim any detailed knowledge on such matters.

10. Q. Did your troops have all the CW protective equipment previously indicated [redacted]
- A. Source stated that his unit had as CW protective equipment a gas mask, protective stockings which fitted over boots, protective gloves, and protective capes. These items were standard CW issue. No decontamination or medical kits were carried on the exercises. There were no decontamination kits or individual medical aid kits in the company.
11. Q. Previously you said that at a regimental officers' roll call prior to the 9 February 1954 division exercise, it was mentioned that a large-scale atomic weapon maneuver had been held in the Carpathian Military District in fall 1953. Who mentioned this and what was said?
- A. [redacted] Colonel Chernyshevich (fnu), had mentioned such a maneuver without giving further details.
12. Q. Is it possible that the atomic training phase of the exercises that you have described consisted of nothing more than the donning and the wearing of CW protective equipment and an explanation of decontamination procedures? Were there any umpires employed, casualties assessed, or tactical dispositions and formations taken up which were different?
- A. Source stated that in these exercises the troops donned all CW equipment when warned of an explosion. Decontamination was merely simulated. There were no umpires to the best of source's knowledge and he did not think that casualties were assessed in the Soviet Army maneuvers. Tactics used were those normally employed in a small Soviet unit approach march and meeting engagement. The tactics were apparently executed poorly.
13. Q. Do you remember any of the sketches that you saw, particularly in the Sergeants' and Soldiers' Atomic Defense Handbook?
- A. To the best of source's knowledge, none of the manuals had illustrations of any kind, except the graphs illustrating atomic dosages [redacted]
14. Q. What is the decontamination substance in the 100-gram bottle in the chemical decontamination kit [redacted]
- A. Source said that the substance was "Dichlorethane".
15. Q. You have referred previously to radioactive substances (BRV-- Boyevyye Radioaktivnyye Veshchestva) as being one of the effects of an atomic explosion, according to the explanation in several of the manuals [redacted] Is it your idea that there are possibly two general but separate types of atomic weapons, one of which could give off BRV without an explosion?

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- A. Source stated that the manuals had referred to the following types of atomic weapons: (1) atom bombs (projectiles) and (2) BRV. Source could offer no explanation for the word "projectile" (snaryad), except that it always appeared in parentheses following the word "bomb".

It was his understanding from the manuals that one of the aftereffects of atomic explosions was radioactivity (BRV). However, he stated that BRV can be produced in a mixture with toxic substances (OV-- Otravlyayushchiye Veshchestva), without the need of an explosion.

16. Q. How many actual atomic lectures did you attend or know of?

- A. Source attended only one lecture, which was given by the regimental surgeon. There may have been others, although he never heard of any.

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17. Q. What did you mean by your previous statement that the Armed Forces Atomic Warfare Defense Manual recommended "full use of our own (Soviet) atomic weapons as a countermeasure against enemy atomic attack"? Can you give any further details?

- A. Source said that the manual listed atomic weapon usage as a prime deterrent or countermeasure against hostile atomic attack, but the manual gave no further information.

He had no idea of what Soviet atomic weapons existed or how they would be used. He had no information on specific tactical changes in frontages, dispersion, etc.

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Source stated that Colonel Chernyshevich gave no further explanations of how military doctrines had been revolutionized. Chernyshevich had merely stated to an officer's assembly in November 1953 that "atomic warfare has revolutionized military doctrine"

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18. Q. Do you know any details of the atomic weapons of any nation? Have you ever heard of atomic artillery and/or its proposed tactical usage?

- A. Source had no specific knowledge of any Soviet or other nation's atomic weapons or their usage. He had never heard of atomic artillery.

19. Q. What changes in Soviet artillery employment in offense and defense have resulted from the availability of atomic weapons? Will heavy concentrations of artillery continue to be used? Will the chief reliance be placed on atomic weapons, including atomic artillery?

- A. Source believed that one manual gave rules for the use and role of supporting units such as artillery, supply, and transportation, but he never read the chapter. He remembered several references which led him to believe that large concentrations were to be avoided, but there were no such references in the training or teaching

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20. Q. What information was given in the manuals as to the degree and radius of damage to an enemy that could be expected from various atomic weapons used in a tactical situation?

- A. Source stated that the Armed Forces Atomic Warfare Defense Manual (Nastavleniye O Protivo-Atomnoy Zashchite Voysk) mentioned three general types of atomic bombs which were classified according to destructive power:

- (1) Small atomic bomb -- 20 KT of TNT.
- (2) Medium bombs -- 50 KT of TNT.
- (3) Large bombs -- 100 KT of TNT.

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A small-type bomb had the following effect:

- (1) At 400 meters from the point of explosion, tank cupolas would be blown away; concrete pillboxes ruined or leveled; and trenches, even those especially reinforced, completely leveled.
- (2) At 2,000 meters, stone and brick buildings would be destroyed unless protected by natural barriers.
- (3) At an unspecified distance from the point of explosion, the intense bright light could cause complete blindness.
- (4) At an unspecified distance from the point of explosion, parts of the human body unprotected by clothing could receive severe burns.
- (5) At a distance up to 800 meters from the point of explosion, wooden structures and trees would be set on fire or charred.

21. Q. What air elements are designated to deliver atomic bombs in tactical situations? How is the air delivery of atomic bombs in tactical situations controlled? Describe in detail the techniques of air-ground coordination required for the air delivery of atomic weapons in tactical situations.
- A. Source had no detailed information. He did not recall whether the manuals contained military instructions or principles governing atomic weapon usage. In a lecture in November or December 1953, the commanding general of his division said that there was in existence a large fleet of bombers capable of delivering atomic bombs from the USSR to any city in the US without refueling en route and that the USSR had atomic guided missiles of a practically unlimited range of action which were able to reach an altitude of 180 km.
22. Q. How is the increased mobility of infantry, as required by atomic warfare, to be achieved? Are additional transportation elements for infantry units to be organic, attached, or in support? Describe those units and their proposed operation.
- A. Source remembered only that the Armed Forces Atomic Warfare Defense Manual ordered some modifications of tactical doctrines to meet the requirements of atomic warfare. Source stated that he did not know a great deal about tactical and strategic doctrines of the Soviet Army. According to his recollection of the manual, there was a definite tendency in the Soviet Army to get away from mass troop concentrations for offensive and defensive actions. The modifications of tactical doctrines, as far as he could remember, were as follows:
- (1) Larger attack and defense zones were assigned to tactical units in order to avoid excessive casualties inflicted by atomic weapons. No specific norms for the extension of unit areas in combat were given by the manual.
 - (2) In atomic warfare the first attacking echelon was to be composed of tank and mechanized units, with only very limited participation, if any, of the infantry, in order not to expose the infantry to atomic casualties. The manual stressed the need for greater mobility of units in order to reduce to a minimum the time in which troops passing through an affected zone would be exposed to radiation.
 - (3) In case of an atomic attack by the Soviets, troops occupying forward positions, i.e., the first three lines of trenches (battalion reserves included), were to be moved three to five kilometers to the

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rear in order to protect them from the harmful effects of their own atomic weapons. However, in order to protect these three lines of trenches against a surprise enemy attack, the manual envisaged small detachments that were well-organized and protected against atomic effects being left in the forward positions with the task of holding them for Soviet units. Source did not remember whether the manual specified when these units would find it safe to return.

- (4) Prior to an atomic attack by the enemy, the enemy would have to evacuate his forward positions and move the bulk of his first line units three to five kilometers to the rear. The manual therefore advised the use of this period for Soviet attack and possession of unprotected enemy positions.
- (5) The units assigned for an attack under atomic warfare conditions were to advance toward the enemy in marching columns protected by advance detachments. The marching units were to deploy for combat only after the advance detachments met with organized resistance from the enemy.
- (6) Source did not remember whether the manual emphasized decentralization of command. He knew that there were quite a number of references, probably in several of the manuals, stressing the necessity for encouragement, promotion, and development of initiative of commanders on all levels as a definite requirement in atomic warfare.
23. Q. What did the manuals say about the means of communication to be employed in offense and defense in atomic warfare? Will additional communications elements -- organic, attached, or in support -- be made available to ground units? What type of equipment will be used and how will it be used?
- A. Source had no knowledge either of defensive measures to be used in connection with communications centers and channels, command posts, and headquarters, or of methods of re-establishing unit control after atomic attack [redacted] Source did not know if the atomic reconnaissance personnel [redacted] required additional means of communications.
24. Q. Please elaborate on the planning required by atomic warfare in offense and defense from the highest to the lowest levels. At what command level is the decision made to employ atomic weapons? Will most Soviet offensive breakthroughs involve the use of atomic weapons? What aspects of control would an army, corps, division, or even regimental commander have over the employment of atomic weapons?
- A. Source had no knowledge on atomic warfare planning other than that listed in No. 22 above. He did not know what command echelons had control of atomic weapons. He believed, as a personal opinion, that the Central Committee of CPSU or the General Staff of the Army would make this decision as to their use [redacted]
25. Q. What means will the Soviet Army use for detection of likely enemy atomic strikes? Describe the indications which the Soviet Army considers indicative of a probable enemy atomic strike.
- A. Source had no knowledge on the detection of atomic strikes by an enemy other than that listed in No. 22, (4); above.
26. Q. What measures will the Soviet Army take to render an area which had been subjected to enemy atomic attack safe for ground troops?

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27. Q. What part is played by atomic weapons in the pursuit? What types of atomic weapons are considered advantageous for employment in pursuit? How is their employment controlled?

A. Source did not believe that atomic weapons would be used in pursuit, as the pursuers would be affected. This is purely opinion.

28. Q. You have indicated that the meeting engagement would be the normal form of engagement to be expected in atomic warfare. Is this statement based upon your own analysis as a result of your training or is it so stated in Soviet manuals? Please describe in detail the organization and execution of a meeting engagement in event of atomic warfare.

A. The Soviet Army manual Field Service Regulations (Polevoy Ustav), published by the Ministry of Armed Forces in 1950, dealt with meeting engagements, but the atomic manuals said nothing about meeting engagements. 2

During the battalion exercise, one rifle company in trucks acted as a vanguard and was reinforced by two 57-mm AT guns and two or three SU-76-mm guns. Next came the battalion artillery and the rifle and MG companies. The field kitchen and supply trucks brought up the rear.

29. Q. What part would mobile defense play in event of atomic attack?

The Armed Forces Atomic Warfare Defense Manual stressed that, in an atomic attack, defense would be on a wide front.

30. Q. Do you feel that the threat of a retaliatory atomic attack by an enemy might make the Soviet Army hesitate to use atomic weapons in tactical situations? On what grounds do you base your opinions?

A. Soviet propaganda stressed that the Soviets would use atomic weapons only in retaliation -- that they would not use them unless the enemy employed them first.

31. Q. Will the Soviet Army units in East Germany and Austria include training for offensive and defensive atomic warfare in their summer field training areas and in their fall maneuvers? What will this training consist of and how can it be identified?

A. Source had no knowledge of training exercises with atomic overtones in GOFG and CGF except the instructions by the Commanding General of the 95th Gds Rifle Division that all officers would familiarize themselves with the new atomic manuals sufficiently to be able to train subordinates in winter 1953 and in the exercises in February 1954.


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35. Q. What units will have atomic weapons organic to them? What are the types and sizes of artillery pieces capable of firing atomic projectiles?

A. Source has no knowledge of the T/O&E of atomic weapons.

36. Q. Are atomic weapons in the hands of any units at the present time? What sizes of atomic projectiles, bombs, and warheads are available or will be available to the Soviet Army?

A. Source did not know if any atomic weapons were in the hands of units.



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37. Q. What Soviet ground atomic weapons are in existence at the present time? Do you have proof of their existence?

A. Source had no knowledge on Soviet ground atomic weapons.

38. Q. How are atomic projectiles supplied to units? Is there a special organization for this supply?


A. Source did not know how or to whom atomic projectiles would be supplied.

39. Q. What do you know of the mobility of Soviet ground atomic weapons? What types of aircraft may be used to deliver them? What type or types of atomic bomb load would they have?

A. Source had no knowledge on this subject.

40. Q. How will the development of Soviet and US atomic weapons affect the organization of the Soviet Army?

A. Manuals stated that special reconnaissance units



would be activated. He did not think that any other changes would be made except for a possible increase in the medical units.

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
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2. Comment: The Ministry of Armed Forces became the Ministries of Navy and War in 1950.

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